TASK FORCE RUSSIA -- BIWEEKLY REPORT 10-23 OCTOBER 1992 8TH REPORT

TASK FORCE RUSSIA (POW/MIA)

REPORT TO THE U.S. DELEGATION, U.S.-RUSSIAN JOINT COMMISSION ON POW/MIAs

23 OCTOBER 1992

HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS

This report has been prepared for the use of the Commission in pursuit of our mission. While it is an unclassified document in accordance with Department of Defense classification guidelines for POW/MIA information, it nonetheless contains casualty-related information and should not be disseminated outside of Commission channels pending efforts by the Department of Defense Executive Agent to locate and notify as many of the next of kin as feasible.

BIWEEKLY REPORT ON SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES

TASK FORCE RUSSIA (POW/MIA)

Period of Report: 10--23 OCT 1992

ADMINISTRATIVE NOTE: Due to the requirement to support the upcoming Senate hearings, the closure date of the next report will be 13 November 1992, covering the events of three weeks rather than two. The report will be published on 20 November 1992.

1. SUMMARY: The reporting period was characterized by extremely high levels of activity, both in Moscow and in Washington. The Moscow office reported on an interview with a Korean War-era Soviet veteran whose testimony further supported the belief that the Soviets were directly involved in the interrogation of high-value U.S. POWs in Korea, and who also offered reminiscences of a Cold War shootdown in the Caucasus. Moscow assisted POW/MIA family members in their attempts to gain information from Russian officials; continued to negotiate support agreements with Russian archives; prepared for extended site visits to Vorkuta/Syktyvkar and Khabarovsk; provided a background interview to journalists representing NEWSWEEK and MOSCOW NEWS; and provided a wide range of supporting information and correspondence to the Russian side. The Washington office made distinct progress in reconciling the various lists of names provided by the Russian side relevant to the Korean War, and unearthed documents that support the belief that the number of U.S. POWs liberated from German camps by the Red Army who were not repatriated was, at most, in the low hundreds. Washington met with or communicated telephonically with a number of POW/MIA family members anxious to assist TFR in its work; interviewed Colonel Walter "Bud" Mahurin (USAF, Retd.), who provided a first-hand view of the conditions under which U.S. POWs were interned in North Korea and China; continued TFR's translation, archival research and analysis program, and began active support to the November Senate hearings on the POW/MIA issue. TFR analysts also prepared a paper that provides an interim summary of our progress to date, entitled: "Russia And The Fate Of U.S. POWs From Four Wars." This paper is attached to this report as Annex A. Further, TFR-Washington conducted a preliminary analysis of the documents -received from the Russian side at the last meeting of the Joint Commission. The summary of this analysis is attached as Annex B. Finally, the Executive Secretary provided TFR with a revised list of operational priorities. This list is attached as Annex C.

2. UPDATE ON ISSUES FROM PREVIOUS REPORTS:

A. The 9 October Biweekly Report identified eleven U.S. service members who originally had been declared MIA and later reclassified KIA/BNR when no further information was obtained on them after the end of hostilities. TFR continues to review the U.S. military casualty files on these servicemen to reevaluate the circumstances of loss and any evidence that may indicate a changed status. We will pursue any anomalies with the Russian side. Information on one of these servicemen (who is on the unaccounted

for list) provided by a third party indicates that he was conspicuous by his heroic determination to say nothing to his interrogators, despite intense pressure over an extended period. Also, one entry from the lists previously reported as unidentified has been positively correlated with a POW who was returned to U.S. military control. Another entry has beer. identified as a Canadian service member and POW who was returned to Canadian control. TFR continues to seek clarification from .he Russian side on all names that have not been positively correlated to U.S. holdings.

B. A painstaking trace of all archival information on U.S. POWs of the Germans who were liberated by the Red Army indicates that the total number of those ultimately unaccounted for was in the low hundreds. Our research continues, and a detailed analysis, with full archival citations, will be published as an appendix to a future Biweekly Report.

C. TFR-Washington expanded its program of contacting U.S. citizens and residents with relevant experience and information. We conducted the interview with former Korean War POW Colonel Mahurin (see below), scheduled a number of interviews with former POWs and officials for the next several weeks, communicated with concerned private individuals, and took steps to better exploit the knowledge within the emigre community.

D. TFR-Washington also pursued its attempts to have relevant classified documents from the Korean War and Cold War periods declassified so that they can be shared with the American people.

E. TFR-Moscow met with Igor Lebedev, Director of the History and Records Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), and Igor Boukharin, Deputy Chief of an unidentified MFA directorate. Discussions centered on a possible cooperative research agreement. Under the proposed terms, Russian archivists would dedicate their efforts to research the MFA holdings for information relevant to the POW/MIA issue, while the U.S. Government would supplement the researchers' salaries and cover incidental expenses. Lebedev agreed in principle with all elements of the draft proposal. Nonetheless, some questions remain on both sides, and at least one additional meeting will be necessary to finalize the agreement. If this program proves worthwhile, it could serve as a model for agreements with other archives, whose practical problems fall into two general categories: insufficient funds to pay their employees salaries, and inadequate office equipment to tailor products to Western standards.

F. The Moscow office made a follow-up contact with Leya Lvovovich Green, sister of George Green who had been identified in Vorkuta as an American prisoner- once held in a local prison camp. She indicated that Mr. Green had served ten years of a twenty-five year sentence in Vorkuta. Since his release, he has been in Moscow. She stated that she and her brother had been born in Canada, but were now Russian citizens. Mr. Green is currently in the United States on a tourist visa. TFR-Washington contacted him by telephone. Mr. Green was cooperative and forthcoming. He acknowledged having been an inmate in Vorkuta. When questioned about any possible knowledge of Americans in the Vorkuta camps, he claimed to recall a sailor named "Bill" from the Midwest ("north of Texas") who had served on a battleship in the Pacific in WWII. Bill died of tuberculosis in the camps. He also recalled a black American (name unknown) who was a deserter. He had been tried as a spy and sentenced to 25 years. He could not adjust to the climate and died in camp. Both of these men were in the camp system in the approximate timeframe 1950-52. Mr. Green stated that, since burials were routinely in mass graves with "just a stick" for a marker, locating and identifying the remains would not be possible. TFR asked Mr. Green to contact us if he recalled any additional specifics. He provided his Moscow telephone number in case Commission representatives wish to contact him.

[MSG CITE: CDRPERSCOM ALEXANDRIA VA 211023Z OCT 92]

3 SIGNIFICANT INTERVIEWS AND MEETINGS ATTENDED:

A. TFR-Moscow interviewed retired Soviet Colonel Aleksandr Semyonovich Orlov on 5 October. Although this occurred just prior to the start of the reporting period, the routine delays in message processing prevented its description in the last biweekly report. The Orlov interview was the most significant of the several conducted in both Russia and the U.S. whose results reached TFR-Washington

analysts during this reporting period. Orlov currently works at the Institute of Military History in Moscow. Born in 1924, he joined the Red Army in 1942 and served as a tank unit commander and staff officer, ending the war in Austria, where his unit linked up with U.S. forces serving under Patton. In 1952, he graduated from the Military Institute of Foreign Languages, where he studied English and Pushtu. During his term at the language institute, he served an extended, voluntary TDY in China and North Korea, where he worked radio intercept missions against the U.S. Air Force and became involved with U.S. POW issues. He later worked on the intelligence staff of the Baku air defense district of the Soviet strategic air defense forces, where he served during several Cold War incidents in the Caucasus. He then served in Moscow before moving to the staff of the Military History Journal then to the staff of the Institute of Military History, where he served both prior to and following his retirement. He holds a doctorate in history. The highlights of his interview were:

--He and his comrades who served in China sometimes wore Chinese uniforms without insignia or markings.

--Lieutenant General Georgiy Ageyevich Lobov, Commander of the 64th Air Corps, ordered Orlov to North Korea to interrogate several captured U.S. pilots, via questionnaires submitted to the North Koreans. Three other officers accompanied Orlov, two of whom have since died. The third officer, Valeriy or Valentin Sokolov, was last known to Orlov as residing in St. Petersburg.

--In North Korea, the interrogation group reported directly to SRU Colonel Aleksey Ivanovich Zherabyatov, the intelligence advisor to the North Korean staff.

--The Orlov group's reports also went to General Li, Chief of North Korean intelligence, believed by Orlov to have been in charge of U S POWs

--The questionnaires submitted by the Orlov group dealt primarily with technical and tactical information. The group prepared the questions in English, then forward the answers to headquarters.

--Orlov personally knew of no efforts to recruit Americans. He stated that he usually never saw the U.S. pilots.

--An exception was the time in July 1951 when Orlov and a Pravda correspondent named Tkachenko received KGB permission to interview a captured 5th Air Force staff member by the name of LTC (first name unknown) Black [Analyst's note: this appears to have been LTC Vance Eugene Black, shot down on 2 May 1951, who died in captivity on 1 November 1951. His death was witnessed by First Lieutenant Robert J. O'Shea, USMC]. This officer was of high interest to the Russians, who wanted to exploit him for propaganda purposes. Black's staff officer experience made him especially interesting compared to run-of-the-mill pilots. The interview took place in Pyongyang, near "Komer San" (NFI). Orlov served as the interpreter and wore either civilian clothes or a Chinese uniform, he could not remember which. No KGB or GRU personnel were present; however, several North Koreans attended. The interview lasted about an hour. Orlov claimed he could not remember the specific questions asked, but believed they were of a professional and technical nature.

--Another exception was a U.S. pilot for whom he interpreted. Orlov could not clearly remember details from this case, admitting that the details tended to blur with those of the Black interview.

--Orlov claimed that the interrogation process was completely controlled by the Chinese and North Koreans on their respective territories. He said that the North Koreans were especially guarded about their prisoners and treated the Soviets with caution.

--When initial interrogations raised further questions, the Soviets could submit an additional written list of questions.

--The Orlov group did not prepare reports. All copies of the completed questionnaires were forwarded to the GRU. Orlov believed that these interrogation reports should be extant in the archival fonds of the

GRU, Soviet Advisory Group, 64th Fighter Corps, and, definitely, in the Korean Intelligence archives.

--Orlov served in this capacity from May to July, 1951, after which his group was replaced by another group of officers from the same source. Orlov did not recall the names of any members of the follow-on group. Nor did he know to what extent the other officers became involved in the interrogation process.

--Orlov did recall a Soviet translator (Korean language) named Vladimir Drozdov, who translated the interrogation questionnaires into and from Korean.

--Orlov later headed a radio reconnaissance and jamming subunit in the Caucasus. He tracked U-2 and other reconnaissance flights. Sometimes the orders were to shoot them down, at other times to force them down.

--Orlov specifically recalled the 27 June 1958 incident in Armenia, when a C-118 was shot down because the pilot did not heed the Soviet fighter pilot's command to land. According to Orlov, five crew members bailed out, while the other four remained with the plane. All nine survived. Orlov was personally involved in escorting the live crew members to Baku, where they remained under KGB custody for seven days. They were eventually returned to U.S. control. [Analyst's note: This corresponds to Incident #26 on the Cold War Incident List. All U.S. service members survived and were repatriated].

--Orlov also recalled the EC-130 shootdown of 2 September 1958. Orlov was certain that all eleven crew members-perished. Only six bodies were returned, as the other five bodies were destroyed in the crash. He said that the Soviets never admitted shooting this plane down, to his knowledge.

--Orlov stated that, in the late 1950's and 1960's, all Soviet "war" planes carried flight recorders along with cameras in their nosecones. He believe that the tapes, films and shootdown reports might still exist, although he could not rule out their destruction as part of routine archival purges after a certain period of time had expired.

--Orlov also provided a list of various veterans he believed might be helpful to Task Force Russia's interview program.

[MSG CITE: AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 151645Z OCT 923

B. TFR-Moscow met again with Vladimir Kozlov, Deputy Co- chairman of the Russian side of the Joint Commission. Kozlov stated that the Russian side was preparing for a "large-scale" transfer of documents to the U.S. side. He also stated that the Russian side was working to complete its own initial assessment of their research effort in time to support the statement on the POW/MIA issue to be made either by President Yeltsin or General Volkogonov at the end of October.

[MSG CITE: AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 161907Z OCT 92]

C. TFR-Moscow met with a delegation from the "Krasnoyarsk Russian/U.S. Friendship Society POW/MIA Commission." The delegates offered no useful information, but expressed a profound interest in joint financial undertakings.

[MS& CITE: AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 161907Z OCT 92]

D. TFR-Washington interviewed Colonel Walter "Bud" Mahurin (USAF Retd.), a former combat pilot with twenty-five shootdowns from World War II and Korea. Col. Mahurin was shot down by ground fire on a mission over North Korea and became a POW. He was extremely helpful to TFR in providing background information on how U.S. POWs were handled and interrogated. Highlights included:

--The recollection of one interrogation in which a Soviet may have been a direct participant.

--His certainty that interviewee Plotnikov had confused him with someone else when describing the

details of his capture. [Note: In an interview earlier this year, retired Colonel Plotnikov had recalled Mahurin's capture after bailout. Colonel Mahurin rode his crippled aircraft to the ground. Other details also differed.]

--His suggestion that three pilots whom he knew might have been taken to the Soviet Union.

--Details of his personal experience.

4. SIGNIFICANT LETTERS/PHONE CONTACTS: TFR-Moscow received no letters or phonecalls from former Soviet citizens during the reporting period. TFR-Washington received numerous phonecalls from POW/MIA family members anxious to assist our effort, and spoke with Mr. Green as detailed above. No new information of immediate utility arose from these contacts; however, several in-person meetings are planned.

5. SIGNIFICANT ARCHIVES OR OTHER DOCUMENTS OBTAINED: TFR- Washington received 18 pages of Russian-language archival documents forwarded from the Moscow. These documents have received an initial review and await translation. They pertain primarily to the Cold War period and do not appear to offer any vital new information. They are logged as TFR-23. Additionally, TFR-Washington researchers and analysts reviewed thousands of pages of U.S. archival material, with results either reported above, summarized in Annex A, or pending further analysis.

6. SIGNIFICANT CONUS ACTIVITIES: TFR-Washington translators finalized the latest volume of translations, which will be published simultaneously with, but not as an element of this Biweekly Report. Analysts continued the archival work mentioned above; pursued the issue of U.S. WWII POWs of the Japanese held temporarily (not in formal camps) at labor sites in the Kuriles; and spent a great deal of time on interagency coordination in the attempt to assure that no potential source of information goes untapped. A list of archives obtained during the recent 21-24 September Commission meeting in Moscow and a preliminary general analysis of this material is included in Annex B.

7. OPERATIONAL PRIORITIES: Following the nomination of revised operational priorities by TFR, we received an approved list from the Executive Secretary to the U.S. Russian Joint Commission on POW/MIAs. These revised priorities are listed at Annex C.

a. RECOMMENDATIONS:

A. TFR-Moscow continue to follow up on all leads, with special attention to those provided by Colonel Orlov.

B. TFR-Washington follow up on Colonel (Retd.) Mahurin's recollection that three U.S. pilots may have been taken to the Soviet Union.

C. TFR-Washington expand activities to include appeals to appropriate veterans' groups as well as to the Russian emigre community in the U.S. News releases to newspapers and newsletters should be employed to solicit POW/MIA-related information from their constituents.

D. Request DoD Office of POW/MIA Affairs pursue the possible use of Voice of America to broaden our appeal to citizens of Russia and other former Soviet republics.

ANNEX A to Task Force Russia Biweekly Report of 23 OCT 92

SUBJECT: "Russia And The Fate Of U.S. POWs From Four Wars"

Introduction:

It has been seven months since the initial meeting of the Joint U.S.-Russian Commission on POW/MIAs. During this time, personnel of both sides have devoted tens of thousands of man-hours to our attempt to

answer the questions of the American and Russian peoples on this humanitarian issue. We face a formidable challenge that requires of both sides a willingness to put the past behind us and cooperate n a spirit of trust and openness that frankly has not characterized relations between our two countries in the past. We have taken up this challenge with energy and dedication.

To support the U.S. Delegation, the Department of Defense tasked the Department of the Army to serve as executive agent for the POW/MIA issue as it pertains to possible Soviet involvement with U.S. POW/MIAs from World War II to the present. The Army established Task Force Russia to support the work of the Commission. Under the directorship of MG Bernard Loeffke, the Task Force has become an essential part of the Commission's work as it collects and analyzes POW/MIA-related information from both Russian and U.S. sources with the goal of full accounting of all POW/MIA personnel.

Since the Commission's inception, we have obtained from the Russian side 849 pages of original archives and related material relevant to our mission. In addition, Task Force Russia conducted

92 interviews with former Soviet citizens as well as numerous interviews with U.S. citizens anxious to support our efforts. The latter include repatriated POWs, former government officials, emigres from the former Soviet Union, POW/MIA family members, and journalists. Task Force Russia supplemented the information thus acquired with extensive research in U.S. archives, then subjected all of the material we compiled to a rigorous analysis whose only prejudice has been on the side of the unvarnished truth.

Using these methods, we have begun the process of answering the questions so important to the American people. Although our term of operations has been brief--and not without its frustrations--we believe we are off to an acceptable start. The paragraphs below tell the story of how far we have come.

I. The Work of the Commission.

This paper summarizes the state of our knowledge as of 31 October 1992 regarding U.S. POW/MIAs who may have been held on the territory of the former Soviet Union. In order of priority, the Joint U.S.-Russian Commission on POW/MIAs has concentrated on obtaining full accounting of POW/MIAs from the Vietnam War, the Korean War, the Cold War and World War II. We have made some modest progress; however, our task is unfinished. There are many difficult challenges facing the Commission, requiring determination and perseverance. Our work with the Russian side is conducted in a general spirit of cooperation, but, in the cause of honesty, we must note that not all of our counterparts have been as forthcoming as we initially hoped.

President Yeltsin seeks to honor the commitment he made to help resolve this difficult issue. On the other hand, some members of the military and security services may be attempting to use the Commission's work for domestic ends. The situation in Russia is difficult, and vast bureaucracies are struggling for survival. Further, traditions of secretiveness pre-date the Soviet regime and are more difficult to overcome than many here and abroad anticipated in the general euphoria that followed the collapse of communist regimes in Eurasia. We have made progress--greater in some areas than in others--yet much of this progress has only led to additional questions. The summary assessments of each area of concern offered below cannot pretend to perfect truth. These assessments are based upon many, sometimes contradictory pieces of a great puzzle that we are struggling to complete. They represent, however, the sincere attempts of the officials and analysts serving as part of this Commission to begin 'o give the American people the answers they deserve.

II. Vietnam:

The Commission holds no firm evidence at this time to indicate that the Soviets took U.S. POW/MIAs from Indochina to the Soviet Union for exploitation and imprisonment. A very limited amount of hearsay evidence exists to the effect that some U.S. POW/MIAs were taken. We have been unable to confirm any of these reports as of yet; neither do we discount them. We continue to search for verifiable evidence. Third party sources may ultimately yield more information on this subject than will our Russian counterparts, since, if any U.S. POW/MIAs were taken from Southeast Asia, this would remain a highly

sensitive issue today. Many of the Soviet officers who would have been involved are still on active duty, and the potentially culpable organizations are fighting for their continued roles and shares of assets, if not their survival. Requests by the U.S. side to interview Russian officials, past and present, who should be knowledgeable in this area have sometimes been met with excuses or denials. Documentary evidence, one way or the other, has not been forthcoming.

Weighing the slight and unsubstantiated information available at this time, our analysts believe that, if U.S. POW/MIAs were taken to the Soviet Union from Indochina, their numbers were limited. We do know that the Soviets took and exploited mat,riel recovered in Indochina, as well as information from interrogations conducted by the combatants. The Soviets routinely stated information needs to the Vietnamese, and these were addressed during interrogations. Any POW/MIAs who might have been taken to the Soviet Union would have possessed unique knowledge or insights into the technical warmaking capability of the United States that could not have been exhausted in local interrogations. If such individuals were taken, the action occurred as part of a clandestine program. We continue to explore this possibility.

III. Korea:

In spite of continuing Russian official statements to the contrary, we have strong and growing evidence that the Soviets directly interrogated some U.S. POWs in Korea, and probably took selected POWs to the Soviet Union. The numbers of those taken to the Soviet Union were "tens, if not hundreds," according to a well-placed Russian source. As a minimum, the Soviets appear to have culled aircrew members with valuable experience and information from the gene-al POW population. The evidence that POWs from the land force components were taken is less compelling and based primarily on hearsay, yet is sufficient to demand further investigation. The full range of transport means and routes used is not yet clear, but we have credible information that some U.S. service members were held and interrogated in the far eastern city of Khabarovsk, which was both a military and administrative center in the former Soviet Union. The precise numbers and ultimate fate of these prisoners is not known; we do know, however, that they were never repatriated.

Despite powerful testimony from individual Russians and supporting contemporary reports culled from our own archives, the Russian side officially continues to deny that they ever had direct contact with U.S. POWs in North Korea or China, further insisting that absolutely no U.S. POWs were taken to the territory of the former Soviet Union. Their position is at odds with the evidence. We are certain that Soviets were sometimes present at interrogations of U.S. POWs in North Korea and China. Occasionally, according to repatriated U.S. POWs, the Soviets beat U.S. POWs. To date, however, the Russian position has been that archival searches have failed to establish that any such actions occurred. The picture is coming into focus relative to Korea, but much work remains to be done. Our current research indicates that Soviet involvement in the processing of U.S. POWs by the North Koreans and Chinese may have been even greater than initially believed. Soviet support was provided with superb overall security, however, and the inferred program to evacuate select prisoners to Soviet territory was so closely managed that many Russians serving in Korea were never aware of its existence. Documentary evidence would have been minimal and very carefully controlled. Much of this evidence--if it ever existed--may have been destroyed over the intervening decades or even in the course of this Commission's research efforts. Thus, it is very difficult to locate a "smoking gun" in black and white.

This is an area where we are tantalizingly close to finding answers, and we are pursuing those answers with all possible energy and rigor. We have visited and will continue to visit remote sites in search of pertinent information. Overall, our best sources have been Russian individuals who have spoken out voluntarily. These sources have not always proven congenial to the Russian side of the Commission, and, on at least one documented occasion, a high-ranking security services officer persuaded an interviewee to alter his testimony to make it appear that Soviets did not interrogate U.S. POWs on Soviet soil. On the other hand, not all Russians are lying who deny any knowledge of a program to exploit U.S. POWs by transferring them to the Soviet Union, since relatively few individuals--only the actors and key decision-makers--would have known about it. The crucial details that would allow us to resolve the fates of the U.S. POWs in question appear to lie with the Russian military intelligence and security services.

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further progress is up to our Russian counterparts.

V. World War II

Of the tens of thousands of U.S. POWs of the Germans who were confined in camps liberated by the Red Army, it appears that hundreds may not have returned. The exact figures will probably never be known. From the comfortable perspective of half a century, it is easy to forget the terrible atmosphere of destruction, dislocation and loss that prevailed in Germany and, especially, Eastern Europe in 1945. There were tens of millions of dead. Millions more were homeless, living on the roads and in the ruins. Millions of soldiers, not all of them disciplined professionals, scoured the "liberated" territories, and nearly a million German POWs taken by the Russians were marching east. In the West, the allies found themselves with nations to police and feed, and with armies the size of nations to administer. Actions that appear simple to the armchair historian were in fact complex and difficult at that time. The fact that we can account for the vast majority of our European Theater POWs is attributable to a number of reasons, among them the efforts of the U.S. Armed Forces and the International Red Cross, not to mention the German penchant for records-keeping and what appear to have been Red Army efforts to implement the repatriation agreements in most particulars.

We believe, after much analysis, that the POWs who did not return met a variety of fates. Some met tragic deaths after the war's end, either as a result of ill health due to the harsh terms of German confinement; or due to epidemic diseases then rampant in ruined Central and Eastern Europe. Some died in accidents. Some, trying to flee the newly-liberated zones, were probably killed by Red Army soldiers who mistook them for Germans, or who sought to rob them of their possessions. Some may have been killed because they failed to follow the draconian rules laid down by local Red Army commanders. Others may not have wanted to be found, due to crimes committed against their fellow inmates. Some U.S. service members with German or Slavic names, or who were born in lands digested by the Soviet empire, may have been kept as a matter of policy. Additionally, approximately one hundred U.S. citizens--not U.S. service members--who had voluntarily served in German uniform appear to have been held, as well.

The "fog of war" obscured many events, and we cannot today determine precisely how many of our service members may have been held. We can state categorically, however, that the estimates in the high thousands recently publicized in the media are not--and cannot be--correct. Our extant personnel records simply do not support such statistics. Further, the key Western archives which yield such fruitful debriefings and other reports regarding sightings of Cold War and Korean War POW/MIAs, are notably barren on the subject of large numbers of U.S. prisoners from the Second World War supposedly held back by the Soviets.

Frankly, the Soviets were their own worst enemies on this score. They connived to deny members of the U.S. Military Mission in Moscow access to holding camps and transit points for liberated U.S. POWs in Poland--which we had been guaranteed by treaty. In retrospect, it seems clear that they did this because they did not want any witnesses to the immediate and brutal manner in which they went about imposing the government of Stalin's choice on Poland. For those who seek evidence of a conspiracy to carry off large numbers of U.S. POWs, however, this obstructive behavior offers a source of endless speculation.

In summary, the Soviets certainly withheld some of the U.S. POWs they liberated from the Germans. There were sins of omission, and others of commission. The fates of these men were tragic, and we wish to resolve them to the extent possible. But we may, in the end, have to accept that many are forever lost, and, in the interests of historical accuracy, it appears that the Soviets returned the vast majority of those liberated--probably all those POWs whom the men with red stars on their caps felt were covered by the repatriation treaties their masters had signed. We see genuine human tragedy and some Soviet misconduct in this area, but no evidence of a Soviet conspiracy to hold vast numbers of U.S. POWs hostage. One-

very clear piece of evidence in this regard is the comparative willingness of the Russian side to provide archival data on this historical period. If anything, they appear to be proud of the quality of their repatriation effort.

VI. Where Do We Go Now?

We must pursue all open leads with undiminished vigor. Although archival research in Russia has disappointed us somewhat, we are at last beginning to see some results. We are entering into cooperative programs with various Russian archives to fund, on a carefully-controlled basis, the research they do in our cause, and hope this will lead to accelerated and fuller responses to our requests for information. On a parallel track, we place great faith in our in-country interview program. Face-to-face meetings with those who witnessed the events in question are clearly the richest source of information for us, helping us to better target research efforts not only in the Russian archives, but in our own, as well. We visit ever more remote sites where our POWs may have been held, and, in the process, we speak with local citizens and officials. We publicize our search through the national and regional media in Russia and the former Soviet Union, providing an address and telephone number for any residents who might wish to contact us with information. We spare no effort in this good cause.

Our analytical campaign draws on the best talent we could find in the Armed Services and government, and we have already constructed a more sober, detailed and incisive picture of the POW/MIA system vis-a-vis the former Soviet Union than -has ever existed. We have fielded a team that will resolve the outstanding issues to the extent they can be resolved.

We continue, relentlessly, to take advantage of this truly historical opportunity to work with the men who were so long our enemies and who must now decide whether or not they wish to become our friends.

In conclusion, the fundamental tenet of this Commission bears repeating. We are not interested in re-opening old wounds or assigning guilt. We seek neither reparations nor revenge. Our sole aim is to resolve the fates of those U.S. service members who, in selfless service to their country, fell into the abyss of history. Should any of them remain alive, we want to bring them home to enjoy, however belatedly, the peace their sacrifices earned for us all. For the dead, we wish an honorable return. And for the families of these brave service members, for the fathers and sons, mothers, wives and daughters, we want the peace that only a full accounting can bring.

ANNEX B to Task Force Russia Biweekly Report of 23 OCT 92

SUBJECT: Preliminary Readout of Documentation Passed to the U.S. Delegation in Moscow During the 21-24 September 1992 Meeting of the Joint Commission.

1. The documents received were:

TFR-15 One page passed to MG Loeffke during Joint Commission meeting on 21 Sept 92. This is a list of POW camps in the Khabarovsk Kray.

TFR-16 Seven pages passed during the Joint Commission meeting on 21 Sept 92. This is a list of 59 U.S. service members shot down over Korea and who apparently passed through interrogation points.

TFR-17 Six pages of material passed during the Joint Commission meeting 21-23 Sept 92. Reports of three separate air incidents. The first is a copy of a Czech demarche on an F-84 shootdown; the second consists of the findings of an investigation board of a bombing of Soviet territory by a U.S. Navy aircraft; and the third is a report refuting the U.S. version of a B-29 shootdown.

TFR-18 Twenty-eight pages of material passed to Ambassador Toon by President Yeltsin during the Joint Commission meeting. Consists of a report on the work of the Russian side, more information on "Brown," alias Clifford Charles, and information on "Oggins."

TFR-19 One-hundred-forty-five pages of material passed to the Joint Commission during a press conference during the Moscow meeting. Consists of archival data from the Central Military Medical Museum and from the Central Archives of the Border Troops. A detailed break-down follows.

TFR 19-1 Russian-generated cover page.

Documents from the Central Military Medical Museum:

TFR 19-2 Americans in hospitals in liberated Germany. - Sgt Robert R. Bryuehr - Pvt Alois J. Maklin

TFR 19-3 American in hospitals in liberated Poland.

- Pvt Art Lawrence Vehn, No. 1305331, (deceased)

TFR 19-5 List of American servicemen too hurt/ill to be moved from Army and Front hospitals - dated March 1945

TFR 19-6 List of American and English servicemen in hospitals and collection points awaiting transport to Odessa. 3 pages of names, some duplicate TFR 19-5.

TFR 19-9 Supplementary list of American and English servicemen moved from Poland to Odessa. 33 Americans and 45 English moved, 10 Americans and 7 English still in the hospital and not moveable.

TFR 19-11 Telegrams detailing movement of English and American servicemen to Odessa. Includes nature of wounds/illnesses and names. Telegrams very garbled and contain many abbreviations. Names appear to be from lists in TFR-5, TFR-6 and TFR-9.

TFR 19-18 English and American servicemen in Evacuation Hospital 1398 on 11 March 1945.

TFR 19-19 Telegram containing 4 names of unmovable servicemen and describes nature of wounds/illnesses.

TFR 19-20 Handwritten list of American servicemen giving name, rank, birth date and diagnosis. Doesn't say where it's from or date.

TFR 19-21 List from 27 March 1945 giving names and locations of unmovable English and American servicemen in hospitals in Poland.

TFR 19-22 List of wounded/ill American servicemen moved by airplane from Lublin to Odessa on 23 March 1945. List contains 10 names.

TFR 19-23 List of wounded/ill American servicemen moved by airplane from Poznan to Odessa on 23 March 1945. List contains 9 names.

TFR 19-24 List of wounded/ill American servicemen moved by airplane from Lodz to Odessa on 23 March 1945. List contains 5 names.

TFR 19-25 List of Allied servicemen remaining in Lodz due to the severity of their health. List contains 7 names. No date, but resembles lists above for 23 March 1945.

TFR 19-26 Document dated 21 April 1945 list 6 names (4 English, 1 American (Capt. May, Stenarij Penton) and 1 Indian) recovering in hospitals in Poland.

TFR 19-27 Handwritten report stating that 1 Brit and American (Pvt Kitumen, Richard) are in Hospital 3390.

TFR 19-28 Telegram listing 8 Americans and giving their conditions who were in a plane crash. Dated 4 April.

TFR 19-31 Telegram listing Allied servicemen moved to Odessa from Krakow, Lublin, Lodz and Chenstokhov.

TFR 19-36 Telegram reporting 1 American (Lt. Brush, William) and 2 Brits are still in the hospital in Landsberg.

TFR 19-38 3 lists of American servicemen moved from Lublin, Poznan and Lodz to Odessa on 23 March 1945. Handwritten list of 24 names.

TFR 19-41 Typed lists which mirror TFR 19-38 but includes an additional list of 7 American servicemen who are unmovable and are in the hospital in Lodz.

TFR 19-45 Telegram From August 1945 reporting new American and Indian servicemen in a hospital. Telegram contains names of 2 Americans.

TFR 19-46 List of 46 names in hospitals of the Northern Fleet. Not all nationalities given.

TFR 19-54 Questionnaires on 10 American servicemen. Both typed and handwritten.

TFR 19-64 List of 5 American servicemen admitted to Field Evacuation station 15.

TFR 19-65 List of 1 American (Parker, Arthur) and 3 English servicemen in hospital 4652. Dated 18 July 1945.

TFR 19-66 Questionnaires on 5 American servicemen. Typed and handwritten.

TFR 19-71 List of 10 American servicemen in Lublin (hospitals).

TFR 19-73 More questionnaires.

TFR 19-75 Report on an American serviceman (Edmund, Darky-Klard) in a hospital with appendicitis.

TFR 19-76 Questionnaire.

TFR 19-77 Document of the evacuation of 1 American serviceman (Pikan, Christopher) and 1 Brit to Lodz. Also talks about an Indian with tuberculosis and 1 more American serviceman (Obolen, Walter) who is unmovable because of a stomach wound. Document dated 1945. One questionnaire on Piken enclosed.

TFR 19-79 Questionnaires on 10 American servicemen.

TFR 19-89 Order concerning the transport of Capt. Parker.

TFR 19-93 8 illegible names. Lists wounds.

TFR 19-92 List of Allied servicemen in hospital 3813. Contains names of 5 Americans, 3 Brits and 2 Indians.

TFR 19-93 List of 33 American servicemen and the status of their evacuation. Gives name, rank, diagnosis and location.

TFR 19-97 Gives numbers of American servicemen sent to Odessa and names of Allied servicemen too ill for transport.

TFR 19-99 Covers same American servicemen that are in TFR 19-77.

TFR 19-100 Lists 8 American, 3 English and 1 Indian servicemen in hospitals of the front on 30 March 1945.

TFR 19-102 More information on servicemen listed in TFR 19-100. 3 of the a Americans evacuated from Lodz to Poltava. The rest are still in the hospitals.

TFR 19-104 Questionnaire on 1 American serviceman.

TFR 19-105 Mostly illegible document. List has information on 3 American, 1 English, 6 French and 1 French Moroccan servicemen.

TFR 19-106 List of 1 American serviceman (Chek, Giv) in hospital 4182 dated 15 April 1945.

TFR 19-107 List of 1 American serviceman (Capt. Parker, Grover) in hospital 1155 in 1945.

TFR 19-108 Russian cover page.

Documents from the Central Archives of the Border Guards:

TFR 19-109 Report on the internment of a B-25 aircraft on 11 May 1945. Pavel Utchek on board.

TFR 19-111 Autopsy/Death Certificate for Pavel Utchek.

TFR 19-112 Report on burial of Pavel Utchek.

TFR 19-113 Report on the internment of a B-25 aircraft on 10 June 1945. Matthew M. Gladek on board.

TFR 19-115 Autopsy/Death Certificate for Matthew M. Gladek.

TFR 19-116 Results of Soviet autopsy on Matthew M. Gladek. Conclusion: Death from destruction of brain matter as a result of gunshot wound.

TFR 19-117 Report on burial of Matthew M. Gladek.

TFR 19-118 Report on a B-25 aircraft which bombed Japan and then diverted to the USSR where it was shot down by a Pacific Fleet AAA battery. 6 American servicemen buried in a common grave.

TFR 19-119 Partially illegible. Deals with aircraft internment.

TFR 19-121 Deals with the force down of a sport plane in 1969 which was flying to Trabzon, Turkey.

TFR 19-122 Force down of a sport plane in 1969 in an East Block country which borders Germany.

TFR 19-124 Force down of a sport plane in Batumi in 1969.

TFR 19-125 Documents on the detention of a U.S. Major General, a U.S. Brigadier General, a Turkish Colonel and a U.S. Major who landed in the USSR near Turkey.

TFR 19-133 Documents on the detention of a U.S. tourist from Annapolis, MD who crossed into the USSR from Iran in 1966.

TFR 19-138 Documents on the shoot down and SAR of a four-engine U.S. aircraft off Lipaya, USSR on 8 April 1950.

TFR-20 Twenty-two pages, consisting of extracts from the finding guide for Central Government Archives of the Soviet Army.

TFR-21 Four pre-printed forms obtained from the Main Information Center, MND, by Trudy Peterson during the period 21-25 Sep 1992.

2. Preliminary General Analysis

The 240 pages of documentation provided to us by the Russian side in the course of the September 1992 meeting of the Joint Commission contain no "smoking guns."

The great majority of the documents appear to have been selected from the Russian archives in accordance with restrictive criteria, the most salient of which was that no Soviet culpability regarding U.S. POW/MIAs should be admitted or in any way indicated. Taken as a whole, the documents leave the impression that the Russian side has a conscious strategy in culling documents to be transferred to the U.S. side. This strategy appears to consist of a multi-track approach that (1) passes sufficient documentation to satisfy the U.S. side that serious research is ongoing; (2) highlights documentation that shows that, whenever possible, the Soviets followed a positive, humanitarian line toward U.S. service members; (3) shifts any blame that cannot be avoided onto third parties, such as China or North Korea.

This does not mean that the documentation is useless. In the case of the many documents from the Military Medical Archives that reference the names of U.S. WWII-era service members, it may allow us to resolve or better understand a number of individual fates. TFR is working this time-consuming problem at present. In some cases, such as that of the Korean-era "59" list, this documentation provides the first direct evidence that some U.S. aircrew members, previously believed to have died in the downings of their aircraft, survived at least long enough to be interrogated by the North Koreans or Chinese. On the other hand, the "59" list was clearly culled from a master list or lists which the Russian side has not yet shown us.

The documentation ranges from casualty reports filed in 1945 up to current archival finding aids. The great majority of the documentation, however, deals with World War II and Russian medical care provided to wounded or sick U.S. service members. Other documentation traces, albeit sketchily, aspects of the Russian repatriation effort. As noted elsewhere in TFR reporting, the Russians are relatively forthcoming on WWII because they have, in fact, little to hide. For the most part, and with some unpleasant exceptions, they followed the terms of the treaties to which they were signatories. They do not fear U.S. inquiries on WWII and, 80 long as they remain in control of the selection process for documents to be released, they are glad to support U.S. requests for information.

Korea is a different matter. The documentation released is limited and carefully vetted to support the official Russian position that the Soviets had no direct contact with U.S. POWs in either North Korea or China, and, further, that absolutely no U.S. POWs were taken to Soviet territory. The Russians have circled the wagons on this issue. When pressed, they carefully release documentation that places the blame for any misdeeds on third parties. This issue remains highly sensitive and, it now appears, the release of archival information will not reveal the full extent of Soviet involvement; hence the criticality of our interview program.

Information released on Cold War incidents has been disappointing thus far, yet it is of real use in our painstaking efforts to construct a detailed and accurate picture of what happened during--and after--each incident. Again, the documents released to the U.S. side appear to have been carefully vetted to demonstrate compliance with the mission articulated by President Yeltsin, but carefully skirting the issue of possible shootdown survivors who may have been imprisoned in the GULAG system.

Some of the specifics on individual cases appear contradictory, such as documentation that shows one "Clifford Brown" (not a U.S. service member) died in captivity on 17 May 1953, then was paroled on 25 May 1953. This simply may be reflective of the sort of bungling that haunts every bureaucracy.

Importantly, the statement by President Yeltsin that two Americans (Brown and Oggins) were executed on Stalin's orders, as well as the supporting documentation, displays a Russian willingness to admit to some misdeeds in the distant past--but not as regards U.S. service members.

There is no evidence in any of the documents in this release that any Soviets were involved with U.S. Vietnam-era POW/MIAs.

3. Significant Preliminary Findings/Further Analytical Efforts

The nature of this archival material does not support "significant preliminary findings." Rather, we must painstakingly trace dozens of names through our own archives--an extremely manpower intensive task. While it is also a worthwhile task, our initial survey of the documentations merits the cautionary note that, while we can color in the background and perhaps better track some individual fates from the WWII-era, dramatic breakthroughs are unlikely using these tools.

To date, the most important tool has been the "59" list--not because it provides ultimate answers, but because it helps us formulate new, sharper questions regarding both by-name cases and the question of overall Soviet involvement with U.S. Korean War POWs.

We must stress that we have only conducted a preliminary analysis of these documents to date, and the comments above should be not be regarded as definitive and conclusive. Each document will ultimately be processed in detail by the responsible analyst(s). Some of this may take months--although the most promising documents are being scrutinized as of this writing.

ANNEX C to Task Force Russia Biweekly Report of 23 OCT 92

SUBJECT: Revised List of Operational Priorities for Task Force Russia

The Executive Secretary provided the following list of operational priorities to Task Force Russia on 13 Oct 92:

1. Continue to investigate information concerning the transfer of American POWs from North Korea to the Soviet Union.

2. Expand upon contacts established at the Commission's last set of meetings with (former) Soviet Indochina specialists.

3. Seek to obtain information from Vietnamese interrogations of American servicemen from Southeast Asia, with special emphasis on the "questionnaires" referred to by General Abramov.

4. Follow up on names of unaccounted-for U.S. service members appearing on lists of POWs from the Korean War.

5. Seek access to archival documents related to Cold War incidents cited by General Volkogonov.

6. Continue to seek access to KGB/GRU files and personnel relevant to the POW/MIA issue; identify and inspect security service camps for any indication of English speakers.

7. Seek additional information on the graves of U.S. service members from WWII reportedly located on the Kuril island of Iturup.

8. Pursue a joint working relationship with Russian parliamentarian Yurii Smirnov to utilize his FSU network of researchers.

9. Access should be sought to the MVD's comprehensive file of fingerprint cards on Gulag inmates maintained since WWII.

10. [Additional] Site visits should be conducted by TFR investigators.